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Deeply concerned with and shocked by increas-
ing threat of terrorism demonstrated by a serial of 
terrorist attacks that occurred in recent years, such as 
the 5/22 terrorist attack in Urumqi? and the 3/01 ter-
rorist attack in Kunming,? the Sixteenth Session of the 
Standing Committee of Twelfth National People’s 
Congress (Standing Committee) laid heavy impor-
tance on counter-terrorism in the Ninth Amendment to 
the Criminal Law of People’s Republic of China (Ninth 
Amendment) that became effective as of 1 November 
2015. In addition to providing property-related penal-
ties for the offence of organizing, leading and actively 
participating in a terrorist organization and penalizing 
such conducts as instigating others to commit violent 
terrorism activities through disseminating terrorism 
and extremism materials and refusing to submit evi-
dences related to terrorism and extremism offences, 
the Ninth Amendment timely added provisions against 
Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) defined in the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178 
(2014).? Furthermore, article 79 of the Counter-Ter-
rorism Law of People’s Republic of China (Counter-
Terrorism Law) that became effective as of 1 January 
2016 confirms that those who organize, plan, prepare 
to implement, or carry out terrorist activities, advocate 
terrorism, incite the carrying out of terrorist activities 
and provide aid to terrorist organizations, terrorist per-
sonnel, the execution of terrorist activities or terrorist 
activity training should incur criminal liability. This 
article is intended to introduce the background of the 
Standing Committee adding aforementioned provi-
sions referring to UN resolutions and related reports, 
analyze relevant articles in the Ninth Amendment and 
the Counter-Terrorism Law and discuss application 
principles in the case where an act breaks two or more 
articles at the same time.
??????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????
The FTFs refer to ‘individuals who travel to a 
State other than their states of residence or nationality 
for the purpose of perpetration, planning, or prepara-
tion or, or participation in, terrorist act or the providing 
or receiving terrorist training.’? According to this def-
inition, the FTFs can generally be categorized into 
those with the intention to carry out terrorist acts, and 
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those to participate in (receiving or providing) terrorist 
training. It is undoubtedly possible that an actor 
intends the both when traveling to his or her State of 
destination. Two elements must be established to pun-
ish a foreign terrorist fighter. One is the subject 
purpose mentioned above; the other is objective con-
ducts of ‘leaving one’s state of residence or 
nationality’ or/and ‘traveling to a State of destination.’ 
The latter conduct usually follows the former one or, 
to a degree, constitutes the purpose of the former one. 
In other words, it is usually the case that the actor 
leaves his or her state of residence or nationality in 
order to travel to a State of destination. However, the 
two conducts might be separate in specific cases. For 
example, X, a citizen of A State, left A State to B State 
on a business trip. When traveling in B State, X was 
abetted by Y, an ISIS member, and decided to go to 
Iraq to participate in a terrorist attack. Judged from the 
standpoint of A State, X isn't a FTF because s/he had 
no purpose of participating in terrorist activities when 
leaving A State. However, s/he is definitely a FTF 
when seen from the perspective of Iraq because it is 
for the purpose of participating in a terrorist attack that 
s/he traveled to Iraq.
The term ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ originated 
from ‘foreign fighters’, referring to individuals who 
have left their home countries to take part in armed 
conflicts. The phenomenon of foreign fighters can be 
traced back to as early as the Spanish Civil War in 
1940s (Mendelsohn, 2011). But, it did not enter public 
consciousness until the end of 20th century, when a 
considerable number of foreigners fought with the Tal-
iban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan after the 9/11 
terrorist attack in the U.S. in 2001, including many 
citizens from Western countries, such as the ‘Austra-
lian Taliban’ David Hicks and the ‘American Taliban’ 
John Walker Lindh (Malet, 2010). The crucial role of 
foreign fighters in insurgencies both during and after 
the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq further drew intensive 
international attention (Hegghammer, 2010). ‘Foreign 
fighters’ gradually evolved into ‘foreign terrorist fight-
ers’ in academic publications and international 
documents because almost all studies on them have 
associated with terrorist organizations, especially the 
Islamic States (ISIS) and Al-Nusrah Front (ANF) in 
Syria and Iraq.
Although it is impossible to obtain accurate and 
reliable datum on the number of FTFs worldwide, an 
UN report estimated that the number was between 
15,000 and 20,000, with most travelling to join Islamic 
State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), while recognizing 
that the total could be as high as 30,000.? The United 
Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Commit-
tee Executive Directorate (CTED) gathered official 
figures from States where available. According to the 
officially acknowledged number of the FTFs who 
have recently travelled to Iraq and/or the Syria, Tuni-
sia is the biggest state of origin of the FTFs (3,000), 
followed by Turkey (1300), Morocco (1200), Mal-
dives (200), Algeria (170), Malaysia (60)and Indonesia 
(50).? Richard Barrett (2014) believed that there were 
around 12,000 foreign fighters in Syria in the first half 
2014, and they had traveled from at least 81 countries. 
The International Centre for the Study of Radicaliza-
tion and Political Violence (ICSR) located in London 
stated that the total number of foreign fighters in Syria 
and Iraq might have exceeded 20,000 in the second 
half of 2014, and estimated that around 19% (3850) 
came from the EU countries (Bakowaski and Pccio, 
2015).
The FTFs usually commit terrorist activities out-
side their countries of residence or nationality. An EU 
security official estimated that about 10-20 percent of 
fighters in Syria and Iraq from the EU countries had 
no intention to return, and many had even burnt their 
travel documents (Byman and Shapiro, 2014). How-
ever, most countries of origin still deem them a great 
threat and impose severe punishments on them, 
because it has been proven that many FTFs return to 
their countries of origin after receiving terrorist train-
ing, to carry out terrorist attacks, form terrorist 
organizations, recruit terrorists or collect funds for ter-
rorist organizations. According to Hegghammer 
(2010), an estimated 1/9 foreign fighters returned to 
their places of residence to participate in terrorist 
activities, and their participation increased the possi-
bility of successful commission of terrorist attacks. 
The ICSR also pointed out that about 10-30 percent 
foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq returned to their 
states of origin or stayed in states of transition and 
became potential security threat there (Keatinge, 
2014). For example, Mohamed Merah, a 23-year-old 
Frenchman of Algerian descent, shot to death 3 sol-
diers, 3 Jewish students and a teacher in Toulouse, 
France, in March 2012 after receiving terrorist training 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It was estimated that 72 
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terrorist attacks among those occurred in France 
between 2014 and 2015 were related to armed con-
flicts in Syria.?
In order to effectively prevent similar attacks, 
French President Franois Hollande signed a special 
counter-terrorism legislation on 21 December 2012, 
punishing those who received terrorist training abroad 
with as high as 10 year imprisonment and a fine of 
225,000 Euros, while authorizing legal authorities to 
trace terrorists using such special investigation mea-
sures as communication monitoring and phone tapping 
(Wu, 2015). Countries confronted with serious threat 
of the FTFs such as Germany, the UK, Italy, Australia, 
Canada and Norway have also penalized acts related 
to training, recruitment and transportation of the FTFs 
in recent years (e.g. see Bakowaski and Pccio, 2015). 
Meanwhile, the fact that the flow of FTFs is a transna-
tional phenomenon makes it clear that efforts at 
national level, although they are necessary, are insuffi-
cient and international measures intended to coordinate 
national counter-terrorism legislation and activities are 
indispensable and the key to effective prevention and 
punishment of the FTFs.
????? ????????????????????????
??????????????
Due to ‘grave concern over the acute and growing 
threat posed by the foreign terrorist fighters’,? the 
United Nations Security Council that emerged as a 
leading actor since the U.S. 9/11 terrorist attack 
adopted two resolutions to require member states to 
actively take criminal measures against the FTFs. One 
is the Resolution 2170 (2014) adopted on 15 August 
2014. The resolution condemns the ‘terrorist acts of 
ISIL and its violent extremist ideology, and its contin-
ued gross, systematic and widespread abuses of human 
rights and violations of international law’,? and calls 
upon member states to prevent and punish recruitment 
of FTFs by terrorist organizations. In order to suppress 
the recruitment of FTFs, it requires member states to 
take national measures to prevent the flow of FTFs to 
terrorist organizations, and to sanction ‘those recruit-
ing for or participating in the activities of ISIL, ANF 
and all other individuals, groups undertaking and enti-
ties associated with Al-Qaeda under the Al-Qaeda 
actions regime, including through financing or facili-
tating, for ISIL or ANF, of travel of foreign terrorist 
fighters.’? However, the Resolution 2170 does not 
present a clear definition of FTFs. Meanwhile, it indi-
rectly confines the FTFs to those relating to particular 
terrorist organizations such as ISIL and ANF. As a 
consequence, the application scope of the resolution is 
restricted. Therefore, the Security Council adopted the 
Resolution 2178 (2014) at a high summit chaired by 
the U.S. president Obama on 24 September 2014. The 
Resolution 2178 clearly defines the FTFs, requires 
countries to prevent and suppress recruiting, organiz-
ing, transporting, and equipping of FTFs, and the 
financing of FTF travel and activities, and prevent the 
entry or transit of individuals believed to be traveling 
for terrorism-related purposes. What is more impor-
tant, it requests states to adopt the legislation required 
to prosecute (1) their nationals and other individuals 
who travel or attempt to travel abroad to perpetrate, 
plan, prepare or participate in terrorist acts or to pro-
vide or receive terrorist training, (2) willful provision 
or collection of funds (by any means, direct or indi-
rect) by their nationals or in their territories with the 
intention or knowledge that these funds will be used to 
finance the travel of FTFs, and (3) willful organiza-
tion, or other facilitation, including by acts of 
recruitment, by their nationals or others in their terri-
tory, of FTFs.?
Unfortunately, Surveys conducted by UN organi-
zations show that more efforts must be made to 
implement aforementioned UN resolutions, either at 
legislative or at judicial level. For example, the CTED 
reviewed implementation of the Resolution 2178 and 
counter-terrorism legislation in 21 countries under the 
heaviest influence of FTFs following its adoption,? 
and disappointedly found that as of May 2015, (i) few 
States reviewed had introduced legislation prosecuting 
preparatory or accessory acts conducted in the State 
with the aim of committing terrorist acts outside the 
State’s territory, and traveling or attempting to travel 
to a State other than their States of residence or nation-
ality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or 
preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the 
providing or receiving of terrorist training, both which 
have been identified as a high priority; (ii) only 3 of 
the 21 countries criminalize facilitation, including 
organizing, transporting and equipping, of foreign ter-
rorist fighters’ travel. Most other countries rely on 
broad counter-terrorism legislation to cover that 
requirement. 4 States do not have measures in place to 
criminalize the recruitment of foreign terrorist fight-
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ers, and 8 States do not have measures in place to 
criminalize the providing and receiving of terrorist 
training; (iii) The survey also revealed that providing 
terrorist training had been criminalized by more coun-
tries than receiving terrorist training had. This may be 
because the provision of terrorist training is already 
criminalized by states under existing regional instru-
ments that cover that act or because the more active 
nature of providing training, compared with the more 
passive nature of receiving terrorist training, is more 
easily captured under broader preparatory offences 
and raises fewer concerns regarding respect for human 
rights, and (ix) only 13 of the 21 States have criminal-
ized terrorist financing as a standalone offence, and 12 
States had introduced terrorism-financing offences 
covering the financing of both terrorist organizations 
and individual terrorists.?
???? ??????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????
Although the term of ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ 
has been rarely mentioned in academic studies, the 
phenomenon is definitely not new in China. As early 
as in 2010, public reports have revealed that terrorist 
activities in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region are 
closely associated to international terrorist organiza-
tions in Afghanistan, Palestine and Middle-Asia 
countries and a big number of Chinese citizens are 
trained there and then return to China to organize and 
plan terrorist activities (e.g. see Li, 2013). The report 
of ICSR shows that more than 300 Chinese Jihadists 
were fighting in Syria and Iraq in 2014(Bakowaski 
and Pccio, 2015). In July 2015, more than 100 Chinese 
citizens, instigated and controlled by foreign terrorist 
organizations such as the Eastern Turkistan Islamic 
Movement, tried to travel to Syria and Iraq by Thai-
land, Indonesia and Malaysia to participate in Jihad 
there but failed and were sent back to China by Thai-
land police authorities (Jiang, 2015). Therefore, the 
Standing Committee timely added punishments 
against the FTFs in the Ninth Amendment.
????????????????????????????????????????
????????
The provisions intended to prevent and punish the 
FTFs in the Ninth Amendment can generally be 
divided into four categories. The first category is those 
that punish terrorist recruitment. Terrorist recruitment 
is usually composed of three kinds of specific acts, 
namely, (1) propagating and ‘legalizing’ terrorist orga-
nizations and activities, (2) sending recruitment 
messages and instigating others to participate in ter-
rorist organizations or commit terrorist attacks, and (3) 
assistance acts such as producing and transporting 
propaganda materials and managing websites. Article 
120a of the Criminal Law of People’s Republic of 
China (the Criminal Law) amended by article 6 of the 
Ninth Amendment, article 120c and article 120f of the 
Criminal Law added by article 7 of the Ninth Amend-
ment have respectively criminalized recruiting and 
transportation of persons for any terrorist organization, 
terrorist activity or terrorism training, propagating ter-
rorism or instigating terrorist activities and knowingly 
and illegally possessing items that propagate terror-
ism. In addition, organizations and individuals who 
disseminate recruitment messages can be charged with 
illegal use of information network provided in article 
287a of the Criminal Law added by article 29 of the 
Ninth Amendment, Because disseminating terrorist 
recruitment messages and recruiting terrorists can be 
charged with forming an terrorist organization pro-
vided in article 120 of the Criminal Law? and 
therefore falls within the scope of ‘Releasing the infor-
mation for the commission of criminal activities’ in 
article 29 of the Ninth Amendment.
The second one is those that punish acts of orga-
nizing, participating in and financing terrorist training. 
Article 120b of the Criminal Law added by article 7 of 
the Ninth Amendment punishes organization of and 
active participation in terrorist training, and communi-
cation with foreign terrorist organizations or 
individuals for the purpose of perpetration of terrorist 
acts. The ‘organization of terrorist training’ here shall 
cover establishing and planning to establish camps and 
facilities for the purpose of terrorist training, dissemi-
nation of terrorist ideology and teaching skills and 
knowledge regarding terrorist activities, and ‘active 
participation in terrorist training’ shall include both 
providing and receiving of terrorist training according 
to the Suggestions on Application of Law in Cases of 
Violent Terrorism and Religious Extremism (the Sug-
gestion) jointly issued by Supreme People’s Court, 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the Ministry of 
Public Security on 9 September 2014.
Article 120a of the Criminal Law includes those 
providing funds to individual who engages in terror-
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ism or terrorist training into its coverage. Although 
judged from the fact that the content of terrorist train-
ing usually is disseminating terrorism ideology and 
teaching basic skills and knowledge regarding perpe-
tration of terrorist activities, ‘providing funds to 
terrorist training’ mainly refers to providing funds to 
provider of terrorist training, it is completely accept-
able to punish those who finance receiver of or those 
who intends to receive terrorist training defined in the 
Resolution 2178 according to the amended article 
121a of the Criminal Law. On one hand, any training 
would be impossible without a receiver. In other 
words, a receiver is an indispensable constitutive ele-
ment of terrorist training. On the other one, article 5 of 
the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on 
Application of Criminal Law in Cases of Money-Laun-
dering Related Cases issued by the Supreme People’s 
Court on 4 November 2009 provides that ‘financing’ 
refers to ‘collecting and providing funds, materials, 
facilities or other forms of assistance to terrorist orga-
nizations and individuals who engage in terrorist 
activities’. ‘Financing those who travel or plan to 
receive terrorist training’ can be reasonably interpreted 
to be included in ‘other assistance’.
Meanwhile, ‘financing individuals who engage in 
terrorist activities’ partly overlaps with ‘financing the 
FTFs’. As mentioned above, the FTFs include those 
who travel to a state other than their states of residence 
or nationality for the purpose of perpetration, plan-
ning, or preparation or, or participation in, terrorist act. 
According to article 6 of the Criminal Law? and article 
5 of the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court 
on Application of Criminal Law in Cases of Money-
Laundering-Related Cases,? X is punishable under 
this article since the moment s/he plans to leave China 
for another state for the purpose of participation in or 
perpetration of terrorist acts. In such a case, whoever 
finances X by paying for his or her accommodation or 
flights constitutes both an individual who finances 
individuals who engage in terrorism and an individual 
who finances the FTFs. In other words, the terrorism 
organizations and individuals include ‘both those in 
China and those abroad’ (Zhou and Zhang, 2013: 
104). It should be noted here that although no punish-
ment can be found in the Ninth Amendment for the 
‘willful provision or collection of funds (by any 
means, direct or indirect) with the intention or knowl-
edge that these funds will be used to finance the travel 
of FTFs’ provided in the Resolution 2178, an individ-
ual perpetrates these acts can be punished as a joint 
offender of financing terrorist organizations, terrorist 
training or terrorist acts as it is for the purpose of 
financing that s/he provides or collects funds.
Moreover, those who willfully organize or facili-
tate the FTFs outside the territory of China, including 
by acts of recruitment provided in the Resolution 2178 
can be prosecuted according to second paragraph of 
article 121a of the Criminal Law, because the whole 
conduct of organizing or recruiting can be punished in 
China as long as part of it was perpetrated in Chinese 
territory, whether or not the said terrorist act or terror-
ist training is actually in China according to 
aforementioned article 6 of the Criminal Law.
Third one is article 322 of the Criminal Law that 
punishes the act of illegally crossing national border 
(frontier). Article 30 of the Counter-Terrorism Law of 
PRC adopted by Chinese Legislature on 27 December 
2015 authorizes organs issuing exit/entry documents, 
and organs conducting border inspections to deny ter-
rorist personnel and persons suspected of terrorist 
activities entry or exit across border, and to not issue 
documents for entering or exiting the borders, or to 
declare their entry and exit documents cancelled. In 
other words, both terrorist and terrorist suspects are in 
principle prohibited to leave enter Chinese frontier. 
They therefore can only go to such as armed conflict 
regions as Syria and Iraq by illegal means. As a coun-
ter measure, article 40 of the Ninth amendment 
inserted the following part into article 322 of the 
Criminal Law as second paragraph: whoever, for the 
purpose of participating in a terrorist organization, 
accepting the terrorism training or carrying out any 
terrorist activities, illegally crosses the national border 
(frontier) shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprison-
ment of not less than one year but not more than three 
years and concurrently sentenced to a fine, and thereby 
increased both maximum and minimum punishments 
in the original article.?
Last one is article 286a of the Criminal Law 
added by article 28 of the Ninth Amendment that pun-
ishes internet service providers who fails to perform 
the obligations for security management of informa-
tion networks prescribed by laws and administrative 
regulations and refuses to make correction as ordered 
by the regulatory department and thereby lead to the 
spread of illegal information in large amount. The 
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‘illegal information’ undoubtedly includes terrorism 
propaganda, recruitment and radicalization messages. 
Terrorist organizations have been proven skillful in 
using Internet to recruit and instigate. The United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has pointed out as 
early as in 2012 that member states should take ade-
quate legal measures to deal with increased use by 
terrorist organizations for recruitment and radicaliza-
tion (UNODC, 2012: 3-11), and the United Nations 
Security Council also expressed its deep concern over 
the use by terrorists and their supporters of internet for 
terrorism-related purposes in the Resolution 2178.
In order to effectively prevent dissemination of 
terrorism and radicalization information through inter-
net, it is crucial to make internet service providers play 
an active role. Therefore, article 286a of the Criminal 
law is absolutely necessary. However, it is worthy of 
being mentioned that the constitutive element of 
‘refusing to make correction as ordered by the regula-
tory department’ provided in the offence may be 
detrimental to its practical effect. The 36th Statistics 
Report of Chinese Internet Development released by 
China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) 
on 23 July 2015 shows that the number of websites in 
China saw a 6.6 percentage increase in the first half of 
2015 and reached 3.57 million by the end of June 
2015 (CNNIC, 2015). It would be extremely hard, if 
not impossible, for a regulatory department to effec-
tively monitor all these websites and timely issue a 
correction order. Furthermore, how to deal with web-
sites that knowingly allow for spread of terrorism 
propaganda and recruitment information but the regu-
latory department does not timely find the illegal fact 
and issue a correction order is also a question that we 
should answer. Considering article 84 of Counter-Ter-
rorism Law imposes administrative fines on 
telecommunications operators or internet service pro-
viders that do not put into place systems for network 
security and supervision of information content, tech-
nological security precautionary measures and thereby 
leads to the transmission of information with terrorist 
or extremist content without any precondition such as 
being given a correction order, this article suggests 
that the fact that an internet service provider refuses to 
make correction as ordered by the regulatory depart-
ment be provided as an aggravating circumstance 
instead of a constitutive element. And this change can 
include websites that knowingly allow for spread of 
terrorism propaganda and recruitment information into 
the scope of punishment of the aforementioned article 
286a.
Briefly, the Ninth Amendment has criminalized 
all acts that the Resolution 2178 requires member 
states to punish, and the coverage of FTF-related pro-
visions in Chinese criminal law mentioned above, 
although they did not appear until the second draft of 
the Ninth Amendment that was reviewed by the Fifth 
Session of the Standing Committee of Twelfth 
National People’s Congress is much wider than the 
laws against the FTFs in countries investigated by the 
CTED.
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Two characters can be easily identified in the 
aforementioned provisions. One is that accomplices 
are punished as principals. For example, recruitment 
or transportation of individuals for terrorist training is 
theoretically of assistance to organizing terrorist train-
ing, and those who perpetrated the said acts shall be 
punished as accomplice and given a lighter punish-
ment than that provided in article 7 of the Ninth 
Amendment, or mitigated punishment or be exempted 
from punishment pursuant to article 27 of the Criminal 
Law.? However, article 6 of the Ninth Amendment 
provides that those who recruit or transport persons 
for terrorist training shall be punished according to 
article 6 of the Ninth Amendment (assisting terrorist 
training), and thereby increased the maximum punish-
ment to 15 year imprisonment. The phenomenon of 
accomplices being punished as principals is not rare in 
the Criminal Law. For instance, article 358 of the 
Criminal Law punishes recruiting and transporting 
persons for those who organize others to engage in 
prostitution as a separate offense instead of assistance 
conduct of organizing prostitution. Therefore, article 6 
of the Ninth Amendment is not the first one and prob-
ably will not be the last one either.
The other is that preparatory acts are punished as 
perpetration. For example, crossing national border for 
the purpose to participate in a terrorist organization is 
of preparatory act of participating in terrorist organiza-
tion provided in article 120 of the Criminal Law, and 
the perpetrator should at least be given a lighter pun-
ishment than that in the said article according to article 
22 of the Criminal Law.? However, article 40 of the 
Ninth Amendment punishes it as an aggravated cir-
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cumstance of illegally crossing national border. 
Another example is an individual who plans to murder 
targeted persons for the purpose of causing public 
sense of terror. If s/he communicates with foreign ter-
rorists to obtain the potential victims’ information 
before departing China, s/he perpetrates the prepara-
tory act of murder according to article 232 of the 
Criminal Law. Similarly, the newly promulgated arti-
cle 120 (2) punishes communication with foreign 
terrorists or terrorist organizations for the purpose of 
perpetration of terrorist offense as completed perpetra-
tion.
Behind aforementioned characters is of course 
legislators’ resolution to punish and prevent terrorism-
related offenses with severe sanctions. At current 
background of both international and national counter-
terrorism trends, it is completely understandable for 
legislators to take a serious standpoint. Moreover, this 
has been a common choice in western countries such 
as the U.S., France and the UK. For example, the UK 
parliament adopted the Serious Crime Act in 2007, 
which entered force on 6 April 2008, penalizing con-
ducts of iintentionally encouraging or assisting an 
offence, encouraging or assisting an offence believing 
it will be committed and encouraging or assisting 
offences believing one or more will be committed. The 
Act is directed at serious offences and organized 
crime, including terrorist crime and its essence is also 
to enhance punishments for crimes endangering public 
security through sanctioning preparatory acts as com-
pleted perpetration (Ashworth, 2009: 458-61).
However, it must be born in mind that criminal 
legislation against terrorism and terrorist must show 
due respect for international and domestic human 
rights law, and legal measures taken to ensure public 
participation in promulgation and implementation of 
counter-terrorism policies because, as the Geneva 
Academy of Humanitarian Law and Human rights 
(2014) concludes, ‘the past decade has shown that 
many measures adopted for the purpose of combating 
terrorism can undermine the rule of law and respect 
for human rights,’ and ‘it is important to recognize 
that the protection of human rights and the rule of law 
contribute to the countering of terrorism. Arbitrary 
arrests, incommunicado detentions, torture and unfair 
trials fuel a sense of injustice and may in turn encour-
age terrorist recruitment, including of foreign terrorist 
fighters.’? The fact that provisions punishing the 
FTFs in the Ninth Amendment lay noticeable impor-
tance on subjective elements such as the purpose to 
participate in a terrorist organization render it neces-
sary for us to keep alert on their possible arbitrary 
application and adverse effect.
Meanwhile, article 3 of the Counter-Terrorism 
Law defines terrorism as ‘statements and acts that cre-
ate social panic, endanger public safety, violate person 
and property, or coerce national organs or international 
organizations, through methods such violence, 
destruction, intimidation, so as to achieve their politi-
cal, ideological, or other objectives.’ The wording 
‘statements’ here is misleading and gives the impres-
sion that those who make any speeches showing 
sympathy to or supporting political or religious 
appeals of a terrorist organization may be punished. 
However, as far as the Criminal Law is concerned, it 
is not the case. On one hand, article 13 of the Criminal 
Law clearly requires that a crime must be ‘an act’ that 
endangers the State, the society or citizens. A state-
ment is not ‘an act’ and not potential to endanger 
anything as long as it does not abet or instigate others 
to commit any specific offences in the Special Part of 
Criminal Law. On the other one, it is a fundamental 
principle in criminal theory that pure thoughts and 
ideas should not be punished, in other words, ‘the dan-
gerous acts in criminal law exclude those that express 
thoughts in principle’ (Qu, 2004: 121). Therefore, nec-
essary clarifications should be made in implementation 
guidelines to ensure due respect for the freedom of 
speech guaranteed by article 35 of the Constitution of 
People’s Republic of China.
???? ?????????????????????????????????
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Prior to the adoption of the Ninth Amendment, 
the Suggestion jointly issued by the Supreme People’s 
Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the 
Ministry of Public Security had laid down detailed 
instructions on investigation and prosecution of orga-
nizing, leading and participating in terrorist 
organizations and financing terrorist activities. Judged 
from its contents, the Suggestions have covered the 
majority of conducts that the Resolution 2178 required 
member states to penalize. As a consequence, it will 
be often seen that a terrorism-related act breaks two or 
more articles in judicial practice. For example, (i) ille-
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gally crossing national border for the purpose of 
receiving terrorist training abroad constitutes partici-
pation in terrorist organization according to the 
Suggestions, and aggravated circumstance of illegal 
crossing national border (frontier) according to article 
40 of the Ninth Amendment, (ii) providing training to 
terrorists breaks both article 120 of the Criminal Law 
(organizing and leading terrorist organization), and 
article 7 of the Ninth Amendment (organizing terrorist 
training), and (iii) transporting individuals for terror-
ism-related purposes can be charged with illegally 
transporting others to cross national borders provided 
in article 321 of the Criminal Law, or transporting 
individuals for terrorist organizations or for the pur-
pose of perpetration of terrorist acts or providing or 
receiving terrorist training.
It is usual in common law countries for a defen-
dant to be charged with two or more offences for one 
act that breaks several articles in the same law or dif-
ferent ones, for example, Michael Wilson was charged 
with both murder and attempted murder by Memphis 
police, the U.S., for his shooting during a robbery that 
resulted in both death and injury in September 2015 
(Jones, 2015). However, it is a principle that the pros-
ecutor files only one charge against one act in the 
same criminal case in China unless the Criminal Law 
provides otherwise. For example, second paragraph of 
article 157 of the Criminal Law punishes those who 
resist the seizure of smuggled goods by means of vio-
lence or threat under two charges, namely, a 
smuggling-related offence provided in a correspond-
ing article of Section 2 of Chapter 3 of the Criminal 
Law, and preventing State functionaries from perform-
ing their duties stipulated in article 277 of the Criminal 
Law, although the act of resisting the seizure of smug-
gled goods by means of violence or threat is in theory 
considered and should be charged as a part of the act 
of smuggling. Another suitable example is second 
paragraph of article 253 of the Criminal Law. Accord-
ing to the paragraph, a postal worker who steals 
money or property by committing the crime mentioned 
in the preceding paragraph (opening without authori-
zation or concealing or destroying mail or telegrams) 
shall be convicted of theft provided in article 164 of 
the Criminal Law and given a heavier punishment.
Then, according to what principle shall the prose-
cutor chose a charge, for example, in aforementioned 
cases, as neither of the above terrorism-related articles 
provides a special rule as article 157 or article 253 of 
the Criminal does? Theoretically, two principles can 
be applied in the case where an act breaks two or more 
articles in the Criminal Law. One prioritizes special 
provisions and the other provisions that impose rela-
tively heavy punishments (e.g. see Gao and Ma, 
2011:186-7). These two principles seems enough clear 
and easy to apply at first glance. But it has long been 
debated that which one should be chosen over the 
other one in the case where a special provision pro-
vides relatively light punishment or a provision 
imposing relatively heavy punishments is not a special 
one (e.g. see Huang and Chen, 2007 )
In the case of the FTFs, it is rational to choose 
provisions in the Ninth Amendment over those of the 
Criminal Law as the former is both newly added and 
special ones. If the punishments provided in the for-
mer are heavier than those in the latter, to apply the 
principle of special provisions being prioritized may 
lead to no dispute. However, if it was the latter that 
provides heavier punishments, it might be held that 
general provisions should be chosen over the new ones 
so as to realize legislators’ intention to prevent the 
FTFs through relatively severe punishment. For exam-
ple, in the case where X illegally crossed national 
border for the purpose of receiving terrorist training 
three times or more, s/he could be sentenced to a max-
imum punishment of 3 year imprisonment combined 
with fine according to article 40 of the Ninth Amend-
ment, while s/he could possibly be sentenced to 10 
year imprisonment if charged with actively participat-
ing in terrorist organizations provided in article 120 of 
the Criminal Law.
Therefore, it is not unreasonable to insist that the 
principle of provisions that provide relatively heavy 
punishments being prioritized shall be applied in all 
cases where the FTFs are involved, and this might be 
the reason that last paragraph of article 7 of the Ninth 
Amendment states that ‘where the acts provided in 
previous paragraphs constitutes other crimes, they 
should be punished according to provision providing 
heavier punishments’. According to this paragraph, for 
example, a leader of an terrorist organization who 
organized individuals that s/he recruited to illegally 
cross national borders for the purpose to participate in 
terrorist training and thereby caused death to the orga-
nized shall be convicted of organizing others to 
illegally cross national borders provided in article 318 
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of the Criminal Law because s/he could be sentenced 
to more than 7 year imprisonment or life imprison-
ment combined with fine or confiscation of property if 
convicted, while the punishment provided in article 
120 (2) of the Ninth Amendment is more than 5 year 
imprisonment or life imprisonment. The former is 
obviously more severe than the latter, not only because 
of the minimum punishment but also because of the 
supplementary penalties. Then, shall we, referring to 
the last paragraph of article 7 of the Ninth Amend-
ment, apply the principle of provisions providing 
heavier punishment being prioritized in all cases 
where a terrorism-related act breaks more than one 
article and punishments in special laws are lighter than 
those in general law?
It should be admitted that this principle could bet-
ter demonstrate legislators’ serious stance. However, 
the principle of special provisions being prioritized 
shall be applied from the perspective of better regula-
tion of social behavior as long as the law doesn’t 
provide otherwise, especially in the case of newly cre-
ated crimes. To control and regulate social behaviors 
is one of the most important functions of criminal law, 
that is, ‘criminal law shall regulate behaviors of mem-
bers of a given community in advance through 
proclaiming consequences of illicit behaviors, which 
are demonstrated in the punishments imposed on those 
who break the law’ (Yamanaka, 2008:16). In other 
words, criminal law denounces certain acts by provid-
ing them to be crimes and orders members of the 
community to refrain themselves from committing any 
prohibited acts. Obviously, the precondition to realiza-
tion of this function is that members of the community 
are fully aware and understand the criminal norms and 
are able to make free choices following them. Com-
pared to general provisions, special provisions are 
designed to punish those acts or affairs legislators 
intend to stress, and highlight them more sharply. 
Prosecuting and convicting the FTFs in accordance 
with special provisions in the Ninth Amendment is 
helpful in disseminating legislative intention to the 
public more vividly through particular examples and 
make criminal norms better understood and accepted 
into public conscience in practice. If we convicted the 
aforementioned leader who organized terrorists s/he 
recruited to illegally cross national border with 
national border-related crimes, we, while imposing 
heavier punishments on him on her, would render spe-
cial provisions in the Ninth Amendment meaningless 
and undercut public recognition and understanding in 
relation to the FTFs.
Meanwhile, it should be noted that articles that 
provide heavier punishments do not necessarily lead 
to heavier sentencing, because the people’s court will 
make discretionary adjustments on the basis of proven 
subjective and objective circumstances. Applying spe-
cial provisions sometimes may better realize 
legislators’ intent to prevent terrorism crimes by 
severe punishment. For example, in the case of ille-
gally crossing national border to participate in terrorist 
training, the defendant can be punished according to 
article 120 of the Criminal Law (organizing, leading 
and participating terrorist organizations), the maxi-
mum punishment of which is 10 year imprisonment, 
or article 40 of the Ninth Amendment with a maxi-
mum punishment of 3 year imprisonment. Apparently, 
as for legally provided punishments, the former is 
much heavier than the latter. However, if the actor was 
abetted to cross national border to participate in terror-
ist training for the very first time, s/he could be 
sentenced to ‘imprisonment of more than 1 year less 
than 3 years combined with fine’ according to the lat-
ter, and ‘imprisonment less than 3 years, criminal 
detention, public surveillance and deprival of political 
rights’ as ‘other participants’ defined in the former. 
Although the maximum punishments are both 3 year 
imprisonment, the minimum punishment in the latter 
is only 1 year imprisonment combined with fine, 
which is obviously heavier than the former.
??????????
The task of preventing the FTFs cannot be 
accomplished at one stroke. Therefore, counter-terror-
ism policies and laws must be adjusted timely 
corresponding to changes in practice. For example, 
terrorist organizations prior to ISIS needed to collect 
funds from outside so as to support their terrorist acts. 
On the contrary, ISIS and ANF can obtain huge wealth 
from oil wells they control and are financially capable 
of paying for the travel to the country of destination, 
daily living expenses, training and equipment of the 
FTFs. According to officials of a State reviewed by 
the CTED, foreign recruiters in their territory have 
persuaded its citizens to join ISIS with promises of 
financial reward in the Syrian Aral Republic.? This 
new change undoubtedly renders it necessary to pro-
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mote international cooperation in anti-money laundry 
matters. Another example is the ‘broken travel’, a new 
evasive travel strategy to ‘break long-distance travel 
into multiple segments such that it becomes difficult 
to ascertain travel history and travel origin, to prevent 
border authorities and counter-terrorism officials from 
accurately determining where they were prior to their 
arrival in a particular State’.? As a consequence, it is 
critical to prevention of transnational flow of the FTFs 
to effectively cope with broken travel by enhancing 
capacity of border authorities and counter-terrorism 
officials to exchange and analyze travelers’ informa-
tion. Unfortunately, international community has not 
taken efficient steps to correspond to this challenge 
yet.
Becoming aware of the danger and harm the FTFs 
may cause, Chinese legislature added aforementioned 
provisions in the second draft of the Ninth Amend-
ment to the Criminal Law of PRC reviewed in June 
2015. Criminal legislation is no more than the first 
step of a long march. This may be the reason that EU 
documents are suggesting member states adopt both 
criminal measures and administrative measures such 
as deprival of citizenship, restrictions on travel and 
EU Passengers Name Record (Bakowaski and Pccio, 
2015 ). In the future, China shall construct a compre-
hensive policy to prevent transnational flow of the 
FTFs within the framework of the newly adopted 
Counter-Terrorism Law too.
????
??In the early morning of 22 May 2014, two SUVs slammed 
into shoppers gathered at the market in Urumqi, Capital City 
of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and then exploded. 
At least 31 were killed and more than 90 wounded in the 
attack.
??Around 21:20 at the night of March 1, 2014, more than 10 
masked assailants with knives wearing the same outfits 
hacked innocent people at the square, the booking halls, and 
other locations at Yunnan Kunming Train Station. The violent 
incident caused at least 29 deaths and 113 injuries.
??S/RES/2178 (2014).
??S/RES/2178 (2014), preface.
??S/2014/815, para. 14.
??S/2015/338, para.18.
??S/2015/123, para15.
??S/RES/2178 (2014).
??S/RES/2170 (2014).
??S/RES/2170 (2014).
??S/RES/2178 (2014).
??All these 21 countries are the main countries of origin, 
transfer or target, including Afghanistan, Algeria, Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Morocco, Nige-
ria, Palestine, the Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia 
and Turkey.
??S/2015/338.
??the Suggestions on Application of Law in Cases of Violent 
Terrorism and Religious Extremism jointly issued by 
Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate 
and the Ministry of Public Security on 9 September 2014 
provides that “forming a terrorist organization” includes 
recruiting terrorists.
??The article provides that if a criminal act or its conse-
quence takes place within the territory or territorial waters or 
space of the People’s Republic of China, the crime shall be 
deemed to have been committed within the territory and ter-
ritorial waters and space of the People’s Republic of China.
??The article provides that individuals who engage in terror-
ist activities refer to anyone who plans to, makes preparations 
for and perpetrates terrorist acts.
??The original article provides that whoever, in violation of 
the laws or regulations on administration of the national bor-
der (frontier), illegally crosses the national border (frontier), 
if the circumstances are serious, shall be sentenced to fixed-
term imprisonment of not more than one year, criminal 
detention or public surveillance and concurrently sentenced 
to a fine. It contains no aggravating circumstances.
??The article provides that an accomplice refers to any per-
son who plays a secondary or auxiliary role in a joint crime. 
An accomplice shall be given a lighter or mitigated punish-
ment or be exempted from punishment.
??The article provides that an offender who prepares for a 
crime may, in comparison with one who completes the crime, 
be given a lighter or mitigated punishment or be exempted 
from punishment.
??S/2015/338, p15.
??S/2015/338, p.27.
??S/2015/338, p.16.
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